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Don’t pay attention to what you see! 
Negative commands and attention bias
Abstract The paper presents research into the effects of the use of negations in directives (orders, suggestions, requests). 
Three experiments are described that tested the effects of instructions formulated in various ways: direct (pay attention 
to) and negated (don’t pay attention to) commands to focus the attention. Indicators of attention focusing that were used 
include: the correctness of answers to questions about a selection of comic book pages (Experiment 1); the time needed 
to name the colours of stimulus words and the level of recall of these words after completion of the colour naming task 
(Experiment 2 and 3). The results showed that a direct command infl uenced all indicators of attention focusing. However, 
a negated command increased the level of recall of details about the comic book pages, as well as the level of key word 
recall. Both the automatic process that generates the paradoxical effects of negated commands, as well as the controlled 
process of reasoning, may be responsible for the results of the memory task.
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Introduction
Negation is an important element of everyday commu-
nication and an integral part of social cognition and behav-
iour (Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski and Strack, 
2009). It manifests itself mainly in volitional, logical and 
corrective aspects. The volitional character of negation is 
present particularly when we express disagreement, refus-
al (I don’t want this), or objection, as well as in attempts 
to control somebody else’s (or our own) behaviour, such 
as when we forbid someone to do something (Don’t smoke 
in here!, Don’t go there!) (Yaeger-Dror, 2004). The logi-
cal-corrective function of negation, on the other hand, has 
to do with reversing meaning, disclosing the falsehood of 
somebody’s statement, correcting statements and denial 
(e.g. this is not right!, he didn’t do it!). Negative statements 
do not have to directly state the falsity of a sentence, but 
they may merely correct a possible mistaken expectation. 
Wason (1965) thought that we used negations when the 
normal course of events had been altered, when something 
contrary to our convictions or expectations had occurred 
(e.g. John wasn’t late for work today suggests that he usu-
ally is).
In everyday communication, it is often the negated 
commands, requests, and suggestions etc. which are the 
signs of volitional negation. Generally, this type of mes-
sage refers to a state of mind, i.e. emotional states (Don’t 
worry), or the subject of concentration, thinking, attention 
focusing (Don’t think about the failure. Don’t pay attention 
to his appearance. Don’t imagine that you are going to be 
sick). Negated directives also refer directly to behaviour: 
Don’t cry. Don’t be late. Don’t fall down.
The main issue addressed by this article is the possible 
paradoxical effects of using negation in orders, suggestions 
and requests, sentences which are referred to as directives 
in the theory of speech acts (Austin, 1962). The aim of this 
paper is to present the results of my own research into the 
paradoxical effects of using negated directives, specifi cally 
with regard to focusing attention and the automatic charac-
ter displayed by this effect.
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Negation in directives and paradoxical effects 
of negated commands
Generally speaking, directives are imposing statements, 
suggesting or proposing an activity, behaviour or reaction 
(Lyons, 1977). Directives (commands, requests, recom-
mendations, persuasions, suggestions etc.) are often used 
in a negated form. These are mostly prohibitions, which 
are recommendations to refrain from doing something (e.g., 
Don’t walk on the fl oor. It’s wet!) However, negated di-
rectives are not only prohibitions but also suggestions for 
specifi c behaviours and responses. When somebody says to 
you Don’t forget! or Don’t worry!, it is not thought of as 
a prohibition but as an expression of a positive intention, 
a form of advice to remember something or to keep your 
spirits high. One might even be tempted to introduce a cer-
tain gradation of negated commands on a continuum from 
prohibitive commands to encouragement: (1) Don’t walk in 
here! (prohibition) (2) Be careful, don’t fall down! (warn-
ing) (3) Don’t forget it! (appeal) (4) Don’t worry! (an en-
couragement to respond or behave in a positive way).
It is likely that most of us have experienced paradoxi-
cal responses to negated directives, that is, the kind of re-
sponses which contradict the intention embedded in the 
sentence communicated to us. These responses may occur 
in respect of emotional states, involuntary responses and 
the focusing of our attention, or may concern objects of 
thinking. Experience teaches us that the mere suggestion 
Don’t be nervous! can in fact intensify our anxiety, an at-
tempt to calm us down such as Don’t cry! can make us truly 
wail, and an appeal such as Don’t be angry! can certainly 
get the adrenaline going. We are all aware of how this hap-
pens on the level of involuntary reactions, as the experience 
of being commanded to Don’t swallow now! in the dentist’s 
chair and the reaction that follows are rather common. The 
effect discussed here often manifests itself in relation to 
statements regarding the object of thinking or the focusing 
of one’s attention. For example, anyone who hears “Please 
don’t pay any attention to your left hand or any feeling that 
you may have there” may naturally (or even automatically) 
be more aware of the presence of his hand. This effect is 
clearly visible in the case of simple instructions, regarding 
the object of thinking: if you give someone the command 
Don’t think about a white bear!, the automatic response 
will be to think about the beast immediately (in order to un-
derstand what we are supposed not to think about, we have 
to think about it fi rst!). In fact, it turns out that a command 
of this kind may have an even longer-lasting effect, that is, 
it may cause the addressee to think about the object of the 
negated command more than once (Wegner, 1989).
It has been noted in the psychology of language and in 
social and pedagogical psychology that the use of negation 
may generate some counterproductive effects (Giora et al., 
2007) In the traditional view, a negation sign is a kind of 
“instruction” from its sender to a listener to suppress the 
negated information. It has been suggested that the marker 
of negation lowers the level of activation of the negated 
concept in comparison with an affi rmation and makes it 
less accessible (McDonalds and Just, 1989). It is, however, 
clear now that suppression is not a sure thing. In certain 
conditions, the negated concept is activated and retains its 
mental representation (Kaup, 2001; Giora, 2006; Giora et 
al., 2005, 2007). This retention hypothesis is confi rmed by 
research conducted into the priming paradigm. It turns out 
that the negation sign (not-X) does not reduce the priming 
infl uence of X on the target word; for example, the word 
piercing was primed both after sharp and after not sharp 
(Giora et al., 2005). A similar result was achieved with the 
use of the paradigm of affective priming (Deutsch et al., 
2006, experiments 4 and 5). Observation of the effects of 
using negation in natural language suggests that the activa-
tion of a negated concept is likely to occur in the political 
context (Giora, 2007), or in the context of prohibitive signs 
(Giora et al., 2009).
The effects of using negations inconsistent with one’s 
intention have also been discussed in the context of per-
suasive communication and attempts to hinder stereotypes. 
Persuasive attempts containing negation can have a para-
doxical effect. For example, the message “not diffi cult to 
use” can prompt a judgment that is opposite to the one in-
tended (Jung Grant et al., 2004). Training in negation of 
stereotypical content served to enhance both the automatic 
activation of stereotypical associations, as well as the inten-
sifi cation of automatic negative evaluations (Beukeboom, 
Finkenauer and Wigboldus, 2010).
Paradoxical effects of using negation are particularly 
clear in the case of negated directives. A distinctive example 
is the research conducted by D. Wegner, in which the issue 
of negations appears in the context of investigations into 
the mechanisms of mental control and the role of cognitive 
load in generating the failure of such control. According to 
Wegner’s theory of ironic effects of thought suppression in 
cognitive load situations (dispersed attention), any effort 
at mental control, especially the wish to suppress certain 
mental states (i.e. a desire not to think about something or 
not to dwell on it at all), may lead to increased access to the 
suppressed content. In numerous experiments conducted 
by Wegner (Wegner and Wenzlaff, 1996), stronger para-
doxical effects were registered when an instruction was of 
a negative character and stipulated not experiencing certain 
states (suppressing certain states) than when it was posi-
tive and commanded the concentration of one’s thoughts on 
something. Suppression of thoughts can be treated as an 
equivalent of the negation mechanism; in the case of logi-
cal-corrective negation we are dealing with an operation 
of reversing meaning, while in the case of suppression the 
operation concerns volitional negation, such as “don’t do 
something” (for example Don’t think about a white bear). 
The Wegner team’s experiments confi rmed the occurrence 
of paradoxical effects in conditions of cognitive load in 
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such spheres as thinking, concentration, mood, relaxation 
and involuntary movements. For example, in research con-
ducted by Wegner, Ansfi eld and Piloff (1998), one group of 
participants was asked to grasp a pendulum fi rmly and es-
pecially not to move it along the X-axis. The second group 
was also asked to grasp a pendulum fi rmly but without the 
additional instruction to avoid certain movements. In the 
mental-load context (solving an additional task), the pen-
dulum moved along the X-axis more frequently in the case 
of the fi rst group of participants, who had received the Don’t 
move along the X-axis command, than in that of the group 
which was not told about the “forbidden” movement. Lane, 
Groisman and Ferreira (2006) worked with the paradox of 
negated commands in relation to revealing secret informa-
tion. It turns out that an instruction not to reveal content 
(available only to the sender) regularly increased the num-
ber of “leaks”. Possible trouble with realizing intentions 
embedded in negated commands has also been the subject 
of research into ignoring information (Schul and Manzury, 
1990; Schul, 1993).
Negated directives in the context of attention 
focusing
The aim of the experiments described below was to 
examine the possible paradoxical impact of negated direc-
tives on attention focusing. Therefore, the experimental 
plan is linked to the idea of attention, the idea of explain-
ing such phenomena as sensor selection as related to the 
cognitive system’s limited ability to process several piec-
es of information at one time (see Necka, Orzechowski 
and Szymura, 2006, p. 186). Many aspects of selective 
attention are distinguished: a) information resource se-
lection, b) searching of the perception area, c) prolonged 
concentration on a given type of objects, d) division of 
attention and e) attention shifting. The tasks used in the 
experiments described below refer to searching through 
the perception area and concentration on the given type 
of objects.
There is the widely-known phenomenon of paying atten-
tion to the object of a negated command, especially when it 
refers to kinaesthetic sensations within a particular part of 
the body (e.g. Don’t pay attention to your left hand, and par-
ticularly don’t pay attention to its weight). The thing that was 
not an object of the person’s attention, which was not pres-
ent in this person’s stream of consciousness (for example the 
kinaesthetic sensibility of the left hand), suddenly appears 
in his or her consciousness following the suggestion not to 
pay attention. Parallel events take place here: the statement 
of the speaker and the potential presence (accessibility) of 
impressions occur at the same time. Being occupied by some 
activities we are not consciously paying attention to, we re-
main unaware of the experiences of our left hand. However, 
when we hear the command not to pay attention to this hand, 
its experiences automatically enter our thoughts.
In this paper I am interested in fi nding out whether a 
similar effect will occur when the negated order concerns 
an object inaccessible to its addressee’s perception, and its 
exposition is only presaged in the command. The following 
sequence of events would then take place: 1) a negative 
command not to pay attention to something which is not 
yet accessible but is going to be, 2) the exposition of the 
object (among other stimuli) addressed in the key commu-
nication, 3) question testing if the main object was noticed. 
These elements are separated by breaks of several minutes 
in length.
I applied this sequence in a series of experiments. In 
the following experiments the key communicates affi rma-
tive and negative directives) were in written form. They 
referred to different objects and different indicators of 
attention focus taken. The consequences of using nega-
tive commands not to pay attention to some objects were 
checked, and a basic question was posed: could this kind of 
command could lead to paradoxical effects, i.e. the focus-
ing of attention on information referred to by the omitted 
suggestion, and if so, was this is an automatic effect?
Experiment 1 
Participants
Eighty people took part in the experiment: 44 female 
and 36 male students of the Institute of Journalism at the 
Jagiellonian University in Cracow (average age M = 21.37, 
SD = 1.6), randomly selected and assigned to four groups 
(20 people in each). Participation in the experiment was 
voluntary and unpaid.
Materials and procedure
We used a fragment (26 pictures) of the children’s com-
ic ‘Emperor Smith’ from the popular series ‘Lucky Luke’ 
(the title of the series comes from the fi rst name of the main 
character). There is a ‘villain’ among other the characters 
that will be referred to as the ‘gangster’ in the following 
part of this paper. The participants were asked to read a 
selected part of the comic after being given an introductory 
text including the key communicates related to one charac-
ter - the gangster. Four versions of this communicate were 
prepared. The control group text read as follows:
The comic, part of which you are going to read, pres-
ents stories from the main character’s life. Many different 
characters appear, and there are sudden plot twists and un-
usual adventures full of humour. Enjoy the read!
Three other groups were given the same text with an 
additional communicate preceding the last sentence. Con-
trol Group No. 2 received the text with a sentence on the 
gangster which was neither a directive nor an order: There 
are many characters, one of which is the gangster.
Group No. 3 received a direct order, with the text con-
taining the sentence: There are many characters, but pay 
special attention to the gangster.
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Group No. 4, the one receiving a negative command, 
received the text with the following sentence: There are 
many characters, so don’t pay attention to the gangster.
Four groups took part in the experiment: there was 
no mention of the gangster in the introductory text of the 
comic for Group No. 1 (Control Group No. 1), there was 
mention of the gangster in the introduction for Group No. 2 
but without any order (Control Group No. 2), participants 
in Group No.3 received a direct order to pay attention to the 
gangster, and the introduction for Group No. 4 contained an 
order not to pay attention to the gangster.
After reading the fragment of the comic given (the aver-
age reading time was 1 min. 57 sec., SD=30,4 sec. and there 
were no differences between the groups; F(3.76)=0.75, 
p=0.57), the participant was given the unexpected task of 
answering 10 questions about some details of the comic. 
Five questions concerned the gangster (these questions are 
referred to as ‘key questions’ in the following analysis), 
and fi ve others concerned different details of the comic 
(these questions are referred to as ‘control questions’). The 
questions were printed in advance on a piece of paper, and 
participants had to answer in writing.
In both the key questions and the control questions 
there were three questions concerning the picture itself, 
and two questions connected with the characters’ dialogue 
in the speech bubbles. Two of the questions about visual 
details were closed questions (participants had four an-
swers to choose from), and one was open response. Ques-
tions concerning the semantic, verbal aspects of the comic 
were open response. The control questions were arranged 
in a similar manner: three questions concerned pictures 
(two closed questions and one open response), while two 
questions were connected with verbal aspects of the comic 
(open response questions concerning characters’ dialogue). 
Subjects and details of the comic were chosen on the basis 
of a pilot study. Too diffi cult or too easy questions were 
omitted, i.e. questions answered correctly by most of the 
participants or questions that a majority was unable to an-
swer. Special attention was paid to the fact that there should 
be no difference in the level of diffi culty between the key 
questions (concerning the gangster) and the control ques-
tions (concerning other details of the comic). The pilot 
study encompassed two stages and involved 30 individuals. 
First, 43 objects were verifi ed and those that did not fulfi l 
the given conditions were rejected. Next, on the basis of a 
second pilot study, 10 details were chosen which became 
the subjects of the key and control questions. The key and 
control questions were presented alternately on the paper.
Tested variables and expectations.
The main research question was whether negative direc-
tives related to a particular comic character would – para-
doxically – increase attention to that character compared to 
controls groups. The independent variable was the kind of 
statement included in the introductory text (4 levels). The 
dependent variable was attention focus, which was mea-
sured by the correctness of the answers to the questions 
on details of the comic. The indicators of the infl uence of 
the kinds of communicates used on attention focus were 
frequency of the recall of ‘gangster’ details compared be-
tween the groups of participants, and a comparison of this 
result with the frequency of recall of details having nothing 
in common with the gangster.
The idea for creating Control Group No. 2 (in which the 
gangster was mentioned in the introductory text) came from 
the desire to control for the possible factor of expected re-
sults. If, according to expectations, the group receiving the 
negated order gave a higher level of correct answers to key 
questions than the control group, this could be explained 
not by the paradox of negated commands but by the fact 
that the gangster was specifi cally mentioned to them, lead-
ing to greater accessibility in memory of details concerning 
this character. Control Group No. 2 was included in order 
to control for this possibility.
The instructions for Group No. 3 included a direct or-
der to pay attention to one of the comic’s characters, so it 
was obvious to expect a higher level of correct answers to 
the key questions in that group in comparison with answers 
to key questions in the control groups. The most interesting 
result concerns the group which received the negative order 
(Group No.4). It was assumed that the paradoxes of negated 
commands described in the literature and observed in every-
day communication would reveal themselves in the task of 
recollecting the comic’s details, that the participants would 
answer the questions concerning the gangster better than the 
questions on the events in the comic, and also that their re-
call of details on the key characters would be greater than in 
the control group. Those differences should not appear if the 
negative order was understood in accordance with the explic-
it intention included in the command (not to pay attention to 
the gangster). Proof of the paradox of negative orders is also 
found in the lack of differences among the tested indicators 
in comparison with the group receiving the direct order. It 
was expected that Control Group No. 2, where the gangster 
was mentioned without an order to focus attention on him, 
would display no differences in respect of the indicators we 
are interested in compared to Control Group No. 1, and that 
Group No. 2 would have a considerably lower indicator of 
attention focus than the group receiving the negative order. 
The results for Control Group No. 2 would thus be: fi rst, 
proof that the assumed attention focus on the given object in 
the group with the negative order results not only from men-
tion of the object in the instruction, but also from the impera-
tive mood; second, that it would be additional confi rmation 
of the assumption of the paradoxical character of the impact 
of negative orders concerning attention focus.
Results
From the point of view of the research problem, we are 
interested in an inter-group comparison of the answers to 
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key questions (concerning the gangster) and confrontation 
of the results for the key questions with the results of the 
control questions within groups.
We performed a mixed-model analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with two factors. The experiment consisted of 
four (kind of group; kind of communicate included in the 
introduction to the comic) x 2 (kind of questions: key ques-
tions - concerning the gangster vs. control questions - con-
nected with other details not concerning that character). 
The main effect of the kind of group appeared as F(3, 76)= 
4.55, p < 0.01; η2 =0.15. The experimental groups (direct 
order and negative order) did not differ in the level of cor-
rect answers to all of the questions (without the division 
into key and control questions) concerning the part of the 
text that was read (F(1, 76) = 0.77; p = 0.38), and there 
were no signifi cant differences between the two control 
groups (F(1, 76) = 1.52; p = 0.22). Differences, however, 
did appear when we compare the experimental groups with 
the control groups. It turned out that the group with the 
negative order gave a signifi cantly higher level of correct 
answers than Control Group No. 1, (F(1, 76 = 11.85; p < 
0.001, η2 = 0.13) as well as Control Group No. 2, (F(1, 76 
= 4.87; p < 0.05, η2 = 0.06). In addition, the group receiv-
ing the direct order gave a signifi cantly higher number of 
correct answers than Control Group No. 1 (F(1, 76) = 6.55; 
p < 0.05; η2 = 0.07), but in comparison with Control Group 
No. 2 this difference was not statistically signifi cant; (F(1, 
76) = 1.75; p = 0.18).
In addition, there was also the main effect of the kind of 
questions (F(1, 76) = 48.93; p < 0.001, η2 = 0.39); it was 
easy to foresee that the subjects would recall signifi cantly 
more details associated with the key questions than with 
the control questions. This was not the case in every tested 
group; the kind of group and the type of questions (key and 
control questions) revealed a signifi cant interaction; F(3, 
76) = 22.052, p < 0.001, η2= 0.46, which means that the 
correctness of the answers to key questions changed de-
pending on the kind of group (Fig.1).
In Control Group No. 1 the correctness of the answers 
to key questions and control questions was at the same level 
(F(1, 76) = 1.15; p = 0.28). Control Group No. 2 had simi-
lar results (F(1, 76) = 2.60; p = 0.11). However, the order 
not to pay attention to the gangster generated the paradoxi-
cal result that, in this group, details concerning the gang-
ster were recalled signifi cantly more often than the other 
details included in the control questions F(1, 76) = 12.23; 
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.13. This difference was most visible in 
the group receiving the direct order; the results for the key 
questions were signifi cantly higher than for the control 
questions; F(1, 76) = 99.08; p < 0.001, η2 = 0.56.
Making an inter-group comparison only for the key 
questions, we also obtained answers to the main group ef-
fect: F(3, 76) = 12.11, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.32. In the group 
receiving the negative order, the level of correct answers to 
questions concerning the gangster was signifi cantly higher 
than in Control Group No. 1 (F(1, 76) = 19.08; p < 0.001, 
η2 = 0.20), and higher than the result of Control Group No. 
2 (F(1, 76) = 6.23, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.07).
As assumed, the direct order had a clear impact on notic-
ing and recollecting different details concerning the gang-
ster. Proof of this is found in the size of the difference with 
Control Group No. 1 (F(1, 76) = 29.82; p < .001, η2 = 0.28) 
and Control Group No. 2 (F(1, 76) = 12.87; p < 0.001, η2 
= 0.14). However, it turned out that the negative order not 
to pay attention to the gangster also placed this character 
at the centre of attention, and to a similar extent as in the 
group whose participants were told to pay attention to this 
character.
The group to which the gangster was made mention of 
before reading the comic (Control Group No.2) had bet-
ter results for the key questions than Control Group No. 
1; the difference bordered on statistical signifi cance: F(1, 
76) = 3.50; p = 0.065. Thus, it may be concluded that the 
mention of the key character did direct the participants at-
tention to some extent, but to a less extent than the direct 
order and the negative order.
Finally, an inter-group comparison of answers to con-
trol questions was performed. An interesting question 
arose of whether the kind of communicate included in the 
introductory text had an infl uence on the correctness of 
answers to such questions. It turned out that the group 
receiving the direct order (having the greatest number 
of correct answers to key questions) answered the con-
trol questions signifi cantly worse than the group with the 
negative order; F(1, 76) = 7.83; p < 0.01, η2 = 0.09. This 
group also had a signifi cantly lower number of correct 
answers in comparison with the combined result for the 
other groups; F(1, 76) = 4.34; p < 0.05; η2 = 0.05. This 
proves that the order to pay attention to a particular ob-
ject led to less careful registration of other details in the 
comic. The other inter-group comparisons concerning the 

































Figure 1. The average of correct answers to the questions concerning the 
comic; the kind of group interaction and the type of question effect.
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Discussion
In this study we intended to test the impact of variously 
formulated instructions on attention focusing. Two kinds of 
questions were examined by means of checking the number 
of details recalled concerning part of the comic (and, con-
sequently, the participants’ attention focus). First, so-called 
key questions concerning different details connected with 
the gangster, and second, control questions concerning oth-
er details of the comic. Results from the two control groups 
proved that there was no difference in the diffi culty level 
in answering questions from these two categories: partici-
pants gave a similar number of correct answers to the key 
questions and the control questions. Reading the comic fol-
lowing an order to pay attention to the gangster resulted - 
obviously - in paying greater attention to this character than 
to any other element of the comic. A similar effect, how-
ever, was obtained for the negative order group; here too 
the key questions were answered signifi cantly better than 
the control questions. This result shows that the order not 
to pay attention to the gangster paradoxically drew greater 
attention to this character. This conclusion is supported by 
the inter-group comparison of answers to key questions, as 
the group receiving the negated order gave a signifi cantly 
higher level of correct answers in comparison with Control 
Group No. 1 and No. 2. The last group received mention of 
the gangster in the introductory text but not as a directive, 
i.e. without any suggestion to pay attention to this charac-
ter. This proves that we can dismiss the supposition that 
specifi cally directing the comprehenders’ attention to the 
gangster resulted in greater accessibility of this character 
following its having been previously pointed out rather 
than from the paradoxical effect of the negated orders. This 
paradox is confi rmed by the fact that the group receiving 
the negated order gave a similar number of correct answers 
to key questions as did the group receiving the direct order. 
It should be emphasised that for the group with the nega-
tive order, the task of recollecting the gangster’s details was 
not collated with the suggestion not to pay attention to him 
included in the introductory text, which might have led to 
the kind of discord connected with the task of carrying out 
the researcher’s instructions. This means that the level of 
attention focused on the gangster could have actually been 
greater in this group, as is demonstrated by the number of 
correct answers.
Interesting results are also to be found in the answers 
to the control questions. The number of correct answers 
among them may serve as an index of a more or less con-
trolled process of paying attention to the character of the 
gangster (when intentionally paying attention, other details 
are overlooked more easily). The group receiving the direct 
order gave a signifi cantly lower number of correct answers 
to the control questions than the group with the negative 
order. Undoubtedly, this was the price for controlled paying 
of attention to the gangster, which resulted in a less-careful 
registering of other details of the comic. Such costs were not 
borne by the group with the negative order; the correctness 
of their answers to questions regarding details of the comic 
other than the gangster was even greater than in the two 
control groups. Thus, in Group No. 4, details of the gangster 
were noticed not because of the control questions, but rather 
because of unintentional paying of attention, which allows 
us to draw conclusions about the automatic character of the 
described paradox of negative orders.
Further experiments were designed to check the valid-
ity of the aforementioned suppositions. Their aim was – by 
the choice of additional indicators of attention focus – to 
check the hypothesis of the automatic process of attention 
focus with negative orders.
Experiment 2
The inspiration for this experiment design was the 
Stroop task, which concerns testing the attention and in-
terference process of the original design (Stroop, 1935). In 
the classical version this task consists in the fastest possible 
naming of the colour of the font of words denoting different 
colours. The words’ font either matches the colour named 
(e.g. ‘red’ is written in red) or does not match it (e.g. ‘red’ 
written in green). The control stimulus is a nonsensical se-
quence of letters, e.g. XXX. The Stroop test concerns the 
confl ict between the more controlled action of naming the 
colour of the ink and the more automatic action of com-
prehending the content of the word. The indicator of this 
confl ict of two actions is the loss of speed when naming 
the colour of the ink in comparison with the time needed 
for naming the colour of the control stimuli. The fi ndings 
of numerous investigations unambiguously show that inter-
ference occurs when the font colour differs from the mean-
ing of the word (comp. MacLeod, 1991); it takes more time 
for subjects to name a mismatched colour than a match-
ing colour or the colour of geometrical fi gures or a random 
sequence of letters. The emotional Stroop test is based on 
the assumption that the content of some words may auto-
matically grab the subject’s attention. Words having emo-
tional meaning for participants draw greater attention than 
neutral words. The interaction effect has been observed in 
connection with emotional disorders (Mogg, Mathews and 
Eysenck, 1993), participants’ personal interests (Dalgleish, 
1995), and criteria of others people’s evaluations important 
to the participants (Sędek and Krejtz, 2001).
It can be assumed (according to previous application of 
the Stroop task), that the time needed to name the colour of 
the word is the indirect indicator of the degree of concen-
tration on comprehending the meaning of the word. This is 
where the author’s idea to test the impact of the order of in-
terpretation on the attention focus in the colour naming task 
using the interference of the font colour and the word con-
tent comes from. It was assumed that if the meaning of the 
presented words, under the infl uence of an appropriately 
formulated order (a direct order or negated one), draws the 
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participant’s attention, the response time would be longer 
in comparison with the control conditions. The question 
was asked if the differently formulated orders (direct and 
indirect), increase attention focus when measured by the 
time needed to name the colours of the words, and also 
by the level of their later recollection. For this purpose, 
a task consisting in naming the colours of words (names 
common in various nations) was used, in which response 
time served as the indicator if interference arising out of 
an order included in the instruction (an order to pay/not to 
pay attention to names typical for a given nation). Addi-
tionally, the number of correct recollections of the names 
presented names was recorded as the indicator of atten-
tion focus.
Participants
Eighty seven students of psychology took part in the 
experiment, 76 women and 11 men (the average age M = 
19.5, SD = 1.1). Participants were randomly selected from 
among students in university courses chosen to take part in 
the experiment, then assigned to four experimental groups.
In Control Group No. 1 there were 21 people (1 man); 
in Control Group No. 2, where the key nation was men-
tioned but without an order, there were 21 people (1 man); 
there were 23 people (4 men) in Group No.3 receiving a 
direct order, and there were 22 people (5 men) in the group 
receiving a negative order. Participation was voluntary and 
unpaid.
Procedure and equipment
The experiment was carried out in the computer room 
of the Institute of Practical Psychology of the Jagiellonian 
University using personal computers with the following 
confi guration: Intel Celeron 1.11 GHz processor, Panason-
ic 17” monitors, screen resolution 1024x768 pixels, screen 
refresh rate 75 Hz. The experiment was carried out simul-
taneously at four computer terminals connected to the local 
network with a central unit which collected the results. In 
the large computer room only four remote terminals were 
present to eliminate the potential infl uence of other people 
doing the task. Every instruction and task (experimental 
stimuli) appeared on the monitor screen, and the experi-
menter (the author of this paper) ensured the course of 
the experiment was consistent with the procedure (Lucida 
Console font was used, instructions were written in size 12 
font and the stimuli appeared in size 36 font in the middle 
of the monitor).
A specially-designed computer program compatible 
with Windows 2003 was used in the experiment. The fi rst 
part contained sentences constructed in accordance with 
the classic Stroop test: naming (by pressing the right key) 
the font colour (red, green, brown and blue), which either 
matched or mismatched the content of the word. This was 
a training sequence for participants to understand the na-
ture of the task and to learn how to press four keys with 
selected fi ngers without looking at the keyboard. The sec-
ond part contained the actual experimental task. In the 
middle of the screen a series of 14 names written in red, 
green, blue or brown font appeared, and the participants 
named the font colour by pressing the right key. The pro-
gram measured the response time for the font colour: from 
the moment of the word’s appearance of the word until 
the key was pressed (the stimulus exposition lasted until 
the participant’s reaction occurred). The response time for 
the two fi rst words in the series was omitted; in tests using 
response time, such as IAT, it is supposed that responses 
to the two fi rst stimuli are the transition between reading 
the instructions and doing the task, thus the participant is 
not suffi ciently focused on doing the task (comp. Maison, 
2004). Only the correct response times were registered, 
which is why the statistical calculations do not include er-
roneous response times. To verify proper distinction of co-
lours and absence of vision defects among participants, the 
lower limit of acceptable errors was established at 20%. 
A false response was indicated by the word ‘Mistake’ on 
the screen. Response times shorter than 200 ms and lon-
ger than 2000 ms were adjusted by reducing them to 200 
ms and 2000 ms respectively. The test consisted of three 
stages. The fi rst stage (approx. 5 minutes) was for training, 
during which participants had to distinguish colours. Dur-
ing the fi rst training session, the letters ’XXXXX’ in dif-
ferent font colours appeared, and during the second one the 
names of four colours appeared in black font. In the third 
series, the font colour matched the content of the word and 
in the fourth one the name of the colour mismatched the 
font colour. Every series contained 10 stimuli. Response 
times in the training session allow us to state that there 
were no differences between the groups in response times 
for presented colours.
The second stage (approx.approx. 3 minutes) was the 
main experimental task consisting of naming the colour 
of the names of people from different countries. The ex-
perimental series was preceded by the following instruc-
tions: In this part you are going to see a number of words 
in different font colours presented one by one. The colours 
are: green, red, blue and brown. Press the key Z for green 
(zielony), C for red (czerwony), N for blue (niebieski), B for 
brown (brązowy) as quickly as possible. The words which 
are going to appear on the screen are the names of people 
from different countries. Remember to react as quickly and 
precisely as possible.
The aforementioned instructions were used in the 
control group (Group No. 1). Control Group No. 2 re-
ceived the same instructions with an additional piece 
of information, namely, that among the names there 
would be some Jewish ones. The key communicate for 
Group No. 2 was: The words that are going to appear 
on the screen are names of people of different nation-
alities, for example Jewish names. The key communi-
cate for the Group No.3 included a direct order: While 
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doing this task, pay attention to the Jewish names that 
appear on the screen. Remember to react as quickly and 
precisely as possible, but pay attention to the Jewish 
names.
Group No.4 received a negative order: While doing this 
task, do not pay attention to the Jewish names that are go-
ing to appear on the screen. Remember to react as quickly 
and precisely as possible, but do not pay attention to the 
Jewish names.
On the basis of the introductory test concerning the 
association of names with the given nation, the follow-
ing names were chosen: Isaac and Moshe (Jewish), Hans 
and Helmut (German), Jean and Pierre (French), John and 
Bill (American), Boris and Igor (Russian), Sven and Olaf 
(Swedish). There were also two other names used (Jan 
and Marek) that began the experimental series and were 
not taken into account when measuring response times nor 
in the task of names recollection. On the computer screen 
the following names appeared: Jan (blue), Marek (red), 
Boris (green), Isaac (red), Bill (blue), Hans (red), Moshe 
(blue), Helmut (brown), Pierre (brown), Olaf (green), 
Jean (blue), Igor (brown), Sven (green), John (red). The 
fi rst two names were not taken into consideration, thus 
the measurement of response times concerned 12 names. 
The key names were Isaac and Moshe, and the compara-
tive ones were Bill and Hans – in the same two colours. 
The order of exposition was balanced by putting the key 
names in positions four and seven and the comparative 
ones in positions fi ve and six.
The third stage of the experiment was the task of names 
recollection: after the colour naming task the participants 
unexpectedly received the task of writing down on the sup-
plied piece of paper every name they could remember after 
the experimental session (approx. 2 minutes).
Tested variables and expectations
There were two indicators of attention focus taken: time 
needed for stating the colour of the names, and recollec-
tion of those names after doing the task. The fi rst indicator 
was the time needed for naming the colour of the two key 
names (Isaac and Moshe) and two comparative names (Bill 
and Hans). The question was asked if the negative order 
and the direct order connected with Jewish names would 
cause interference in the task involving giving the names 
of colours in comparison with the comparative naming of 
names colours task and the control groups task. Indepen-
dently of accepting two names to be compared with the key 
names, the decision was taken to register the times for nam-
ing of all the names’ colours with the exception of the fi rst 
two in the series.
The second indicator of attention focus was frequency 
of key names recollection in comparison with other names. 
It was asked if the negated order and the direct order con-
nected with Jewish names would impact the level of recol-
lection of those names in comparison with the other names 
of the experimental series, as well as in comparison with 
recollection of names in the control group.
Just as we automatically notice the “redness” of a red 
rose when we look at it (with the exception of certain per-
ceptual abnormalities), we automatically read a written 
word when it is in front of our eyes. And so, when faced 
with the task of defi ning the colours of words in a Stroop 
test, we fi nd it impossible not to notice the meaning of 
these words, as shown by the results of the classic Stroop 
test. For interference to occur, meaning the elongation of 
the response time during an incongruence task (incongru-
ence of the meaning of the word with its colour, for example 
the word “red” is written in blue) participants have to notice 
the meaning of the written word, independently of its con-
sistency with the colour. The longer response time in incon-
sistent cases is the effect not so much of focusing longer on 
the displayed word (inconsistencies attract more attention) 
but taking more time to decide which key to press because 
of the confl ict between the meaning of the word and its 
visual display.
However, I have found no such inconsistencies in my 
own research; in other words, no delayed reaction could be 
the result of a confl ict between the semantic aspect and per-
ceptual data. It is therefore fair to assume that the length of 
a delayed response may be interpreted in terms of a more or 
less controlled focusing of attention on the verbal stimuli. 
The direct command included in the instruction, i.e. to fo-
cus attention on the names of a given nationality, probably 
sets in motion a more controlled process of capturing the 
meaning of the words displayed. It is then easier to antici-
pate that in the group which received a direct command, 
the time for defi ning colours would be slower, and the rate 
of recalling the key names would be higher than in control 
groups.
An important result was observed in the case of the 
group given a negated command: a delayed time for defi n-
ing colours in group 4 in relation to the control group would 
lead us towards the paradox of negated commands, i.e. it 
would be an indicator of increased focusing of attention on 
the meaning of the presented words; however, such results 
would not help us decide if the focusing is controlled, as it 
was in the group receiving the direct command, or rather 
automatic. On the other hand, the fact that there was no dif-
ference in the task of naming colours between the variable 
and control groups would indicate that a negated command 
does not result in a controlled (intentional) focusing of at-
tention on the semantic aspect of the presented words. The 
results of the memory test were supposed to check if such 
a command enhances the automatic character of reading 
verbal stimuli. The automatic focusing of attention could 
be concluded if the times for defi ning the colours of the 
key and comparative names in that group were the same 
as in the control groups, and at the same in the “negated” 
group the recall of key names was better than of compara-




We performed a mixed-model analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with two factors: 4 (Communicate Type: no or-
der vs. Jewish names mention vs. direct order vs. negative 
order) x 2 (Names: key names vs. comparative names). The 
fi rst factor was the cross-object factor, the second was the 
in-object one.
The main effect of the Communicate Type appeared: 
F(3, 61) = 2.62; p = 0.058; η2 = 0.11. The longest 4 names 
naming time occurred in the group receiving the direct or-
der (M = 1238 ms; SD = 350). This effect resulted mainly 
from the difference in response times between the group 
having the direct order and Group No. 2, (M = 1005 ms; 
SD = 228), F(1, 61) = 7.36; p < 0.01; η2 = 0.10. The aver-
age result of the group with the direct order differed sig-
nifi cantly from the combined results of the three remaining 
groups, F(1, 61) = 6.68; p < 0.05; η2 = 0.09.
It should be mentioned that a similar pattern of results 
was obtained with all the names included in the analy-
sis (i.e. all colours used), F(3, 44) = 3.1488; p < 0.05); 
η2 = 0.17. The group with the direct order (M = 1136 ms; 
SD = 428) named the colours slower than the other three 
groups, but a statistically signifi cant difference occurred 
only in comparison with Group No. 2 (M = 889, SD = 276), 
F(1, 44) = 8.19; p < 0.01; η2 = 0.15. In addition, in the case 
of all names the average response time in the group receiv-
ing the direct order differed signifi cantly from the com-
bined results of the other three groups, F(1, 44) = 8>04; 
p < 0.01; η2 = 0.16.
There was neither a main effect of the Name Marked, 
F(1, 61) = 0.21; p = 0.64 (for Jewish names M = 1120 ms; 
SD = 314, for comparative names M = 1095 ms; SD = 312) 
nor an interaction of the Name and the Kind of the Com-
municate, F(3, 61) = 0.69; p = 0.55, so there were not any 
differences between response times for the Jewish names 
and the comparative names within a given group. Thus the 
direct order lengthened the response times in the case of 
key names as well as of the comparative names. However, 
there were no signifi cant differences in response times be-
tween the group receiving the negative order and the con-
trol group.
Name recollection
For the participants, the results of a given national-
ity names recollection could take three different values: no 
recollection, recollection of one name, recollection of two 
names. The basic issue explored was if the recollection of 
Jewish names would be easier in the experimental groups 
than in the control ones and if those names would be recalled 
more often than the other nations’ names.A comparison was 
performed of the average results for recollection of the names 
typical for a given nation in the four groups (Table 1).
It was expected that the kind of the communicate in-
cluded in the order would infl uence the result of Jewish 
names recollection. It occurred that the Jewish names 
were recalled signifi cantly more often in both of the ex-
perimental groups than in the control group. However, 
there were no signifi cant differences in key names recollec-
tion noticed between the group receiving the direct order 
and the group with the negated order, χ2 = 0.76; df = 1; 
p = 0.38. It turned out that the negative order concerning 
attention focus may generate paradoxical effects; this con-
clusion is confi rmed by the lack of inter-group differences 
concerning all other nations besides Swedish. In this case of 
Sweden, differences were generated by a surely accidental 
lack of recollection in Group No. 2).
An interesting result occurred in Group No. 2 in which 
(as opposed to other experimental groups) there was no 
signifi cant facilitation effect in recollection of key nation 
names observed in comparison with the Control Group 1, 
χ2 = 1.43; df = 1; p = 0.23. This means that the mention 
of the nation included in the instructions had a smaller im-
pact on attention than the orders (direct as well as indirect). 
Nevertheless, the impact of the key nation mention caused 
the level of recollection in this group to be insignifi cantly 
lower than in the groups receiving the direct order and neg-
ative order (respectively: χ2 = 1.55; df = 1; p = 0.21 and 
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* p< 0,05; ** p < 0,01
Table 1. Recollection frequency of names from different nations comparison for the four groups (df = 1). Experiment 2.
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between the frequency of the key nation names recollec-
tion with the other nations names recollection in the tested 
group (Table 2).
It turned out that in Group No. 1, Jewish names were 
recalled as often as all the other nations’ names. Also, in 
Group No. 2 the results of Jewish names recollection (al-
though generally higher) did not differ signifi cantly from 
the results for all the other nations. In Group No. 3 (the di-
rect order) they were recalled signifi cantly more often than 
any other except Swedish. Similarly, in the group receiving 
the negative order for only one nation (German), the better 
recollection of the Jewish names was below the level of 
statistical signifi cance.
Discussion
The colours of the given nations naming time was to 
be one of the indicators of experimental manipulation, 
understood as using a direct order and a negated order in 
the instructions. It also turned out that in the group which 
received negated commands, the time needed for defi ning 
colours of words was identical to that in the control groups, 
which means that the negated command did not lead the 
researched group to intentionally focus more attention on 
the content of the words presented to them. In respect of 
the experimental task, the semantic encoding in the con-
trol groups was completely unnecessary, but for Group No. 
3 (the direct order) the instructions implied the semantic 
encoding by the suggestion to pay attention to the names 
of the given nation. Thus, in line with the presumption 
participants in the group receiving the direct order reacted 
more slowly during the colour naming task. However, in 
this group (as well as in the other ones) there was no dif-
ference in response times between the key names and the 
comparative ones. This result allows us to draw the conclu-
sion that the direct order included in the instructions results 
in all the names, not only the Jewish ones which the order 
concerned, drawing more attention. As a result, response 
times in colour naming are delayed. This result is consistent 
with the presumption made in the discussion of Experiment 
1 results that a direct order starts the controlled process of 
attention focusing and stimuli encoding.
The results of the memory test are consistent with the 
results of Experiment 1; in the group with the direct order, 
as well as in the group with the negative order, the key na-
tion names recall was signifi cantly better than almost all 
other nations’ names. However, in both control groups the 
level of the Jewish names recall did not differ from the re-
sults for the other nations.
Using one more control group allowed us to test the 
possibility that better recollection of the key names in the 
group receiving the negative order would not induce the 
negative orders paradox, i.e. automatic attention focus on 
the words that were not supposed to be the object of at-
tention. We attempted to examine other interpretations, 
for example that mention of the Jewish names made in 
the instructions could make them more available, or that 
participants recalled the content of the instructions during 
the memory test, which made recalling the names easier. 
A better key names recollection result was obtained by the 
group receiving the direct order and the group receiving 
the negative order (Groups No. 3 & 4) than in the control 
group (Group No. 1). This could be evidence of the nega-
tive order’s impact on attention focus concerning word 
content. However, in Group No. 2 (receiving no order but 
Jewish names were mentioned in the instructions) the key 
names were recalled more often than in Group No. 1, yet 
the difference was not statistically signifi cant. On the basis 
of results from Group No. 2, we can suppose that the direct 
cause of the facilitation effect in key names recollection is 
the automatic process of focusing on word content during 
colour naming, and the indirect cause is the controlled pro-
cess of inference from the instruction.
Referring to the key issue of the impact of using negative 
orders on attention focus, we can suppose that both of the 
mechanisms described above were involved. While only the 
mention of Jewish names in the instructions did not cause 
a statistically signifi cant difference ofrecollection in both of 
the control groups, the negative order affected the level of 
recollection signifi cantly. Using the mention in Group No. 2 
made key names recollection so easy that there were no sta-
tistically signifi cant differences in the results between this 
group and the group receiving the negative order.






p = 0.54 
p = 1.0 
p = 1.0 
p = 1.0 
p = 1.0 
p = 1.0 
p = 0.12
p = 0.70 
p = 0.34 
p = 0.07 
p = 0.012 
p = 0.021 
p = 0.039 
p = 0.013 
p = 0.42 
p = 0.34 
p = 0.012 
p = 0.031 
p = 0.031 
p = 0.039 
Table 2. Comparison of the key nation (Jewish) names recollection with the other nations names in the four tested groups. 
For all the comparisons df = 1. Experiment 2.
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It should be kept in mind that the presence of four co-
lours and the necessity of operating that the same number 
of keys was connected with a signifi cant cognitive burden. 
The question arises of whether engaging the cognitive re-
sources of the participants in operating the keys could have 
weakened the impact of the experimental manipulation (the 
differently formulated instructions). Thus, we may ask if 
reduction of the number of colours to two, requiring fewer 
cognitive resources engaged in controlling of the keys, in-
crease the impact of the order included in the instructions? 
This question was the inspiration for the design and perfor-
mance of the third experiment.
Experiment 3
Participants
Eighty fi ve students in their 2nd and 3rd years of study 
at the Faculty of Management and Social Communication 
took part in the experiment (73 women and 12 men, aver-
age age M = 21.31, SD = 1.7). They were randomly selected 
and assigned to four groups as in the previous experiment. 
There were 22 people in three of the groups, and 19 people 
in Control Group No. 2.
Materials and procedure
The procedure was identical to that in the previous ex-
periments. The only difference was that two colours were 
used (red and blue), and the name “David” instead of 
“Moshe” (in the preceding test the name was equally often 
indicated).
The following names appeared on the computer screen: 
Jan (red), Mark (blue), Isaac (blue), Bill (blue), John (red), 
David (red), Helmut (blue), Pierre (red), Olaf (red), Jean 
(red), Igor (blue), Sven (blue), Hans (red), Boris (blue). 
The two fi rst names were treated as the practice stimuli, 
so response times and their recollection were not mea-
sured. Two key words that the experimental manipulation 
concerned were Isaac and David, and the two comparative 
names were John and Bill. Rotation of the exposition order 
was applied: in half of the cases the key names were in the 
third and the sixth positions in the list with the comparative 




At the beginning, reaction times to the two key names 
(Isaac and David) and the neighbouring comparative names 
(John and Bill) were analyzed. It is worth mentioning that 
in the case of names from the same nation (including Isaac 
and David) colours naming time was similar. The analysis 
of the variable in the scheme: 4 (Kind of the Communicate: 
No Order vs. Direct Order vs. Negative Order vs. Jewish 
Names Mention) x 2 (the Name: Key vs. Comparative) 
elicited the main effect of the Kind of the Communicate 
F(3, 81) = 20.94; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.43. In the group receiv-
ing the direct order (Group 3), reaction times (M = 865 ms; 
SD = 273) were longer than in the other groups: F(1, 81) 
= 60.67; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.42. The other groups’ reaction 
times did not differ from one another.
It should be mentioned that exactly the same pattern of 
results appeared when only the reaction times to the Jewish 
names were taken into consideration (F(3, 80) = 13.03; p 
< 0.001; η2 = 0.32) and when reaction times to all names 
were taken into consideration (F(3, 62) = 24.22; p < 0.001; 
η2 = 0.53). Also in the cases the colours naming time in the 
group having the direct order was sigIn these cases as well, 
the colours naming time in the group receiving the direct 
order was signifi cantly longer than in every other group of 
comparable results.
The main effect of name was as such: F(1, 81) = 5.26; 
p < 0.05; η2 = 0.061. The colours of the two Jewish names 
(M = 619 ms; SD = 311) were named more slowly than the 
two comparative names (M = 561 ms, SD = 228), which 
mainly affected the results obtained in Group No.3 (dis-
cussed below). Taking the names from all the nations into 
consideration gave an analogical result: F(5, 315) = 8.11; p 
< 0.001; η2 = 0.12, and analysis of the contrasts revealed 
a statistically signifi cant difference between the naming 
time for Jewish names and the colours naming time for all 
the other nations names: F(1, 63) = 17.25; p < 0.001; η2 = 
0.21.
What was the relation between the key names and the 
comparative ones in individual groups? There was no sig-
nifi cant interaction between the Kind of the Communicate 
and the Name, F(3, 81) = 0,98, p = 0,40. Analysis of the 
contrast showed a statistically signifi cant difference in re-
action times only in the group receiving the direct order, 
F(1, 81) = 5.02; p < 0.05; η2 = 0.05; Jewish names colours 
(M = 919 ms; SD = 322) were named more slowly than the 
comparative names colours (M = 812 ms, SD = 287).
In the group receiving the negative order the Jewish 
names colours (M = 557 ms, SD = 243) were also named 
more slowly than comparative names colours (M = 478 ms, 
SD = 218), but this difference did not reach statistical sig-
nifi cance F(1, 81) = 2.76; p = 0.10. In the other groups, 
reaction times were almost identical.
Name recall
The average number of recalled names in the four ex-
perimental groups was calculated, excluding Polish names 
which generated a familiarity effect. Next, as in Experiment 
2, on the basis of the average results for every nation the 
levels of those nations names recall across the four groups 
were compared. The results of this comparison is shown in 
Table 3 below.
Exactly the same pattern of results obtained as in Ex-
periment 2 appeared: Jewish names in both of the experi-
mental groups were recalled signifi cantly more often than 
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in the control group (Group No. 1), while the names of the 
other nations were recalled equally often in both of the con-
trol groups. In the group with the direct order the Jewish 
names were recalled more often than in the group receiv-
ing the negative order, but this difference did not reach sta-
tistical signifi cance, χ2(1) = 3.03; p = 0.08. Once again, a 
result demonstrating that the direct order and the negative 
order signifi cantly increase the level of key names recall 
was obtained. In Control Group No. 2 the Jewish names 
were recalled more often than in Group No. 1, but this dif-
ference was not signifi cant, χ2(1) = 2.11; p = 0.14. Those 
two groups did not differ in the level of recall of the other 
nations’ names. In Control Group No. 2 the indicator of 
Jewish names recall was signifi cantly lower than in the 
group receiving the direct order, χ2(1) = 7.15; p = 0.007, but 
did not differ signifi cantly from the indicator of the group 
receiving the negative order χ2(1) = 1.09; p = 0.29. Thus, 
the mention of the Jewish names included in the instruc-
tions had an impact (lesser, however, than the orders) on 
improved recall of the key names. In the case of the other 
nations the Kind of the communicate factor did not infl u-
ence levels of recall. The value of the difference between 
recall of Jewish names and those of other nations in every 
group (McNemara test) was also established, as illustrated 
in Table 4.
In Group No. 1, both the Jewish names and the other 
nations names were recalled with equal frequency. A simi-
lar result was obtained in Group No. 2, in which the recall 
level was signifi cantly lower only in the case of one nation 
when compared to the Jewish names (in Group No. 2 a side 
effect caused the French names to be recalled signifi cantly 
more rarely). However, in Group No. 3 (the direct order) 
and Group No. 4 (the negative order) the Jewish names 
were recalled signifi cantly more often than any other na-
tion’s names.
Discussion
Using only two keys in the stimulating words colours 
naming task did not change the results signifi cantly. The 
impact of the direct order on the colours naming time was 
much more visible in the new conditions. The order to pay 
attention to the Jewish names in Group No. 3 lengthened 






















































































Names in the 
stimulating series 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 










p = 0.72 
p = 1.0 
p = 0.68 
p = 1.0 
p = 1.0 
p = 0.42 
p = 0.021
p = 0.38 
p = 0.22 
p = 0.26 
p = 0.035 
p = 0.000 
p = 0.013 
p = 0.000 
p = 0.001 
p = 0.032 
p = 0.002 
p = 0.057 
p = 0.007 
p = 0.092 
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Table 3. Comparison of the frequency of particular nations names recall in the four groups.(df = 1). Experiment 3.
Table 4. Comparison of recall frequency of key nation names (Jewish) and the other nations names in the four groups. 
Experiment 3.
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reaction times in comparison with those for comparative 
names; reaction times to all the names were longer in this 
group than in any other group. However, the negative or-
der did not lengthen the names colours naming time, which 
was similar in both control groups.
In Experiment 3 (using two keys) the power of the fa-
cilitation effect was emphasized in the groups receiving the 
direct order and the negative order, both in comparison with 
other names in those groups as well as in the level of recall 
of the key names in the other two groups. However, in this 
experiment as well the results in Group No. 2 suggest that 
the level of names recall is infl uenced somehow not only by 
the communicate in the form of a directive, but also by the 
mere mention of the nation included in the instructions.
General discussion
Results of the three experiments described above support 
the view that using negative directives would paradoxically 
draw attention to the prohibited object. They highlight the 
automatic nature of the infl uence of such communicates. 
The experiments presented here can be interpreted in the 
context of communicative competence, for which the ba-
sic issue is the relationship between the speaker’s inten-
tion and the effect achieved; in other words, the infl uence 
of the statement on its addressee. In the case of directives, 
the speaker’s intention is to make the addressee follow the 
instructions in the statement. When we ask (demand, order, 
beg) “Close the window”, the intention of this statement is 
fulfi lled when the addressee closes the window (conversely, 
it is not fulfi lled when the addressee remains indifferent or 
opens the window more widely).
To make any speech act effective, that is, compatible 
with the speaker’s intention, several conditions have to be 
fulfi lled (comp. Searle, 1969). Also, in respect of direc-
tives the authors of the theory of speech acts defi ned the 
conditions that must be fulfi lled for them to be effective or 
fortunate (Grice, 1975); among them they list the prepara-
tory condition and the essential condition. The preparatory 
condition is that the addressee is able to comply with the 
directive (the ability or possibility to do the action which 
the speaker wants to be done and the willingness to do this), 
and the essential condition is to understand the speaker’s 
intention and to understand what is to be done.
Results of the memory test in all of the three experi-
ments prove the effectiveness of direct orders. In com-
parison with the control groups, people who received the 
order to pay attention to the given object (comic charac-
ter or Jewish names) then answered the questions related 
to those objects signifi cantly better, proving fulfi lment of 
the speaker’s suggestions. Negative orders caused a com-
pletely opposite effect to the openly-declared intention of 
the speaker – results of the memory test show that partici-
pants paid attention to the given object in a similar fashion 
as those receiving the direct order. That occurred in spite 
of fulfi llment of the conditions for effi ciency of the speech 
act which were discussed above. There is no reason to sup-
pose that in the case of negative orders participants did not 
understand the content of the sentence or the intention of 
the order, or purposely sabotaged the suggestions and paid 
attention to the object. This means that the attention focus 
was unintentional and automatic. The direct order led to a 
controlled process of attention focus, which is proven by 
the delay in the names colours naming time (experiments 
2 and 3) and the signifi cantly worse answers to the control 
question than in the group receiving the negative order (Ex-
periment 1).
Using the Stroop paradigm proves that an interfer-
ence effect occurs as a result of the discrepancy between 
a word’s content and its colour, as well as in the case of 
words possessing an affective meaning for the participant. 
The stimuli words used in those experiments did not have 
this character (no experiment demonstrated an interference 
effect in the control group for Jewish names, which means 
that the key nation for the experimental manipulation did 
not have any emotional signifi cance for the participants). 
The results of experiments 2 and 3 show that the direct or-
der stimulated the interference of the colour and the content 
of the words, making the colours naming time longer. This 
effect occurs in both of the experiments, most strongly in 
Experiment 3 during which participants used only two keys. 
In this experiment the group receiving the direct order 
named the Jewish names more slowly than the other nations 
names. A generally longer reaction time was also observed 
compared to the other groups. We may suppose that the or-
der included in the instructions had a greater impact when 
participants were not burdened with operating more keys. 
The order to pay attention to the given nation names made 
the level of recall of those names greater, which could have 
been expected.
However, in the case of the negative order there was 
no interference effect observed; colours naming times in 
Group No.4 were similar to reaction times in the control 
groups. This means that registering the key names was not 
a controlled and intentional process but rather an uninten-
tional and automatic one, and at the same time there was 
not suffi cient attention focus to make reaction times lon-
ger. We draw conclusions about the registration of Jewish 
names from this group’s memory test results, which were 
similar to those receiving the direct order. It is probable that 
two processes were responsible for this effect: the automat-
ic registering of the content of the words that participants 
were not supposed to pay attention to (greater accessibility 
of those words) and controlled recall of the instructions’ 
contents.
Besides the communicative competence context, this 
phenomenon may be placed in the context of language 
competence, i.e. questioning the mechanism of the effect 
achieved by using a negative order directive in reference 
to the issue of negation processing. In social and educa-
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tional psychology the counterproductive effect of negation 
was noted long ago, such as when children asked not to 
do something often perform the forbidden action. We can 
record different explanations for this counterproductive ne-
gation effect. The best-known explanation is based on the 
reactance theory by Brehm, in which a forbidden action 
becomes especially tempting. Another explanation is based 
on the scheme-plus-tag model (Mayo et al., 2004); nega-
tion mark dissociation results in correspondence of a sen-
tence with the negated state of affairs. Also, the two-step 
simulation hypothesis (Kaup et al., 2007) has been used to 
explain this phenomenon; to understand negation we must 
simulate the negated state of affairs mentally before asking 
the question of what action should be taken instead of the 
negated one.
In the introduction I referred to research on ignoring 
information and to Wagner’s theory. Here we should em-
phasize the difference between those paradigms and the ap-
proach taken in the presented experiments. The key element 
in the experiments concerning the omission or ignoring of 
information (often using the courtroom paradigm) is use of 
the order not to pay attention to particular information.
In the courtroom paradigm the order not to pay atten-
tion to information is implemented after this information 
is given. Insight into the process causing omission or ig-
noring of information is gained by understanding the way 
it is represented in our memory, recalled from it and used 
in subsequent statements. In the presented experiments the 
suggestion not to pay attention was related to physical ob-
jects or words which in the future could be accessible to 
our perception. This experimental project would invoke 
the courtroom paradigm if the order not to pay attention to 
some evidence appeared before it was presented. It would 
be interesting to determine if greater diffi culty in ignoring 
(omitting) such information actually occurred.
Wegner’s experiments concerned mental control, not 
the process of communication. I made reference to his tests 
because Wegner had to use instructions including a nega-
tive order to initiate control understood as suppression. 
He achieved paradoxical effects in conditions of cognitive 
load. Those experiments were directly related to the impact 
of the negative orders on the participants’ attention focus 
without the cognitive load, and the negative order was re-
lated to the elementary and automatic process of paying 
attention. In this paper we are interested in the directly 
communicative aspects of negation, or more precisely the 
compliance between the directive’s intention and the ad-
dressee’s reaction.
The results obtained show that negated directives (or-
ders, suggestions, requests) may be anti counterproduc-
tive and provide the speaker with an effect opposite to that 
intended. Thus, if we wish to divert somebody’s attention 
from a given object (or prevent them from paying attention 
to something), it is better not to say anything about the mat-
ter than use a negative order.
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